We estimate a structural econometric model for the credit market in Italy, using bank-level information and the responses of Italian banks to the euro-area Bank Lending Survey to identify demand and supply, focusing on the recent financial crisis. The main results are the following. First, while in normal circumstances the functioning of the Italian credit market is consistent with a standard imperfect-competition model, during phases of high tension there are credit-rationing phenomena. Second, supply restrictions have a relevant impact on lending, both when they are due to banks' balance-sheet constraints and when they are the effect of greater perceived borrower riskiness. Third, to a large extent the tightening during the sovereign debt crisis reflected the common shock of the widening sovereign spread, not idiosyncratic bank funding problems. Fourth, the role of supply was stronger during the sovereign than the global financial crisis, mainly due to greater banks' funding difficulties. In a counterfactual exercise we estimate that in the second quarter of 2012 interest rates were more than 2 percentage points higher and the stock of loans more than 8 percent lower than would have been the case without the tightening of lending standards in the course of the entire crisis.
Introduction

1
Credit developments in the euro area have been powerfully affected in the last five years by the global financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis, and by the accompanying recession. The developments were quite homogenous across countries during the first phase of the crisis, which was characterized by a generalized contraction of economic activity, a marked deterioration in borrowers' creditworthiness and a sharp increase in risk aversion in the financial and credit markets. By contrast, the sovereign debt crisis was characterized by significant heterogeneity, with a concentration of the credit contraction in the countries hit by the sovereign debt strains, where banks' access to wholesale funding worsened abruptly, while elsewhere credit continued to expand.
Understanding the determinants of credit market developments is essential to designing policy responses. In particular, during a phase of credit retrenchment, the relative contributions of weak credit demand from households and firms and supply restriction by banks have to be disentangled. And where supply factors do play a role, it is also important to assess whether the tightening of lending standards depends on a deterioration of borrowers' creditworthiness or a worsening of banks' balance sheets, in connection with financial market distress. Different types of restriction call for different policy reactions. For instance, if the main source of the tightening is a shortage of capital, then recapitalization would be the proper answer. As to monetary policy, when credit supply is mainly hampered by worries about borrowers' creditworthiness, interest rate manoeuvres can enhance credit availability by helping to foster economic recovery; when the main problem is banks' funding difficulties, exceptional liquidity provision (as in the case of the Eurosystem's threeyear refinancing operations at the end of 2011) may be the proper response.
In the same spirit, from a policy perspective it is also important to understand whether the restriction of supply conditions takes place only though an increase in the cost of credit, which brings demand and supply into equilibrium, or through credit rationing, i.e. a 6 condition of excess demand over supply stemming from non-price allocations of credit. In the latter case, there would be a greater risk of a downward spiral between credit shortage and the deterioration of the real economy, calling for a more urgent and a more focused policy reaction.
In this paper, we estimate a structural econometric model for credit in Italy to study the effects of demand and supply factors on both the volume and the cost of lending to enterprises, with a focus on the global financial crisis and the ensuing euro-area sovereign debt crisis. The structural model is indispensable to proper identification of supply and demand, while also making it possible to study the credit market in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e. when the changes in interest rates can clear the market, as well as in periods of credit rationing. The case of Italy is particularly relevant, as lending by Italian banks slowed sharply between 2008 and the first half of 2009 and, after a brief recovery in 2010- 11, turned down again late in 2011, severely affected by the sovereign debt crisis. We focus on lending to enterprises since it was affected more strongly by the crisis than lending to households. The respondent banks are asked for their assessment of demand conditions and an account of their decisions on lending supply standards, including the specific factors driving them (in particular, risk perceptions vis-à-vis borrowers and own balance-sheet constraints). We use these replies as instruments to identify structural equations for credit demand and supply and to estimate their respective contributions to credit developments (the implicit underlying hypothesis, naturally, is that the banks' replies are truthful and thus a valid proxy for actual demand and supply conditions). The BLS responses are combined with individual data on banks' loans and interest rates in a panel analysis. As regards the sovereign debt crisis, we also include as an explanatory variable the spread between the yield of the 10-year Italian government bond and that of the corresponding German Bund, which 2 An analysis of loans to households for house purchase along the same lines as the present one was performed in an earlier version of this study (Del Giovane, Nobili e Signoretti, 2013) ; the estimated correlation between credit market developments and the BLS indicators was much weaker than for loans to firms. 3 The survey includes questions on credit standards, loan demand, factors driving loan supply and demand, specific terms and conditions for loans (such as price and non-price supply conditions). The results are published regularly by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the euro area as a whole and by the Eurosystem national central banks for their respective countries. A detailed description of the survey can be found in Berg et al. (2005). 7 has received great attention by analysts and policymakers as a sort of "sufficient statistic" to gauge the severity of the tensions.
Our paper contributes to various strands of the literature. First, it is part of the abundant literature that uses the BLS (Berg et al., 2005; de Bondt et al., 2010; Hempell, 2004; Hempell and Kok Sorensen, 2010; Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydró, 2010) or other lending surveys (Schreft and Owens, 1991; Lown, Morgan and Rohatgi, 2000; Lown and Morgan, 2006; Cunningham, 2006; Bayoumi and Melander, 2008; Swiston, 2008; Basset et al., 2012) for analyses based on the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey) to disentangle the contributions of demand and supply to credit market developments. 4 Our paper is set apart from most of these studies, which use aggregate data both for survey information and for credit developments, by our use of bank-level information. An exception is Del Giovane, Eramo and Nobili (2011) , which used comparable data to analyze the relative contribution of demand and supply factors in credit market dynamics in Italy during the global financial crisis, up to the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers failure.
With respect to that paper, besides using a longer sample period, which includes the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, and a number of additional controls, we significantly improve the methodology by using a structural model that allows us to estimate the impact of demand and supply factors on both the cost and the dynamics of lending, whereas Del Giovane, Eramo and Nobili (2011) estimated reduced-form equations and only for lending quantities.
Moreover, in analyzing the impact of the sovereign spread on lending supply, our study provides additional evidence on the effects of the sovereign debt crisis on the credit market in Italy with respect to the studies based on macroeconomic data (Albertazzi et al., 2012; Neri, 2013) or on information concerning bank-firm relationships from the Central Credit Registry (Albertazzi and Bottero, 2013; Bofondi et al., 2013) .
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on credit rationing, in particular the seminal "quantitative" approach developed by Fair and Jaffee (1972) and Quandt (1978) , in which the amount of "excess demand" in a given market is inferred by directly relating loan quantity to some explicit exogenous variables (typically a positive change in the price level).
This approach has been taken by most of the econometric studies of credit rationing episodes 8 in the aftermath of financial crises in a number of countries (Pazarbasioglu, 1996; Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999; Kim, 1999; Barajas and Steiner, 2002; Ikhide, 2003; Baek, 2005; Bauwens and Lubrano, 2007; Allain and Oulidi, 2009) . Unlike these works, our paper deduces the existence of excess demand (or supply) from the BLS supply indicators, not changes in the interest rate. This approach is more consistent with the definition of credit rationing, which typically occurs when banks are unwilling to supply additional credit even when borrowers are prepared to pay a higher rate, owing possibly to asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . In this paper we formally test which BLS variable is the best indicator of credit rationing.
The main results are the following. First, the coefficients of our structural model suggest that in normal circumstances the functioning of the Italian market for lending to firms is consistent with the standard models of imperfect competition, in which the intermediaries set the interest rate based on borrowers' riskiness and their own balance-sheet constraints and fully accommodate changes in credit demand (i.e. the loan supply schedule is perfectly elastic to changes in interest rates; see Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Degryse et al., 2009 ). However, during times of financial strain we find evidence of credit rationing (the supply schedule becomes price-inelastic), consistently with models in which lenders limit the supply of credit to borrowers even when they are willing to pay higher interest rates (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) .
Second, the effect of a supply restriction is relevant and statistically significant both when it is due to banks' balance-sheet constraints and when it reflects a heightened perception of borrower risk. We estimate that a tightening of lending standards due to funding constraints reported by all the banks in the panel is associated with an interest rate increase of about 40 basis points on impact (i.e. in the same quarter in which the tightening is recorded), compared with an increase of 20 or 50 points when the restriction is due to increased risk perception (depending on whether this factor is judged to have contributed "somewhat" or "considerably" to the tightening). Considering the interest rate elasticity of credit demand, the resulting effects on the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of lending would amount to a reduction of, respectively, 0.8 percentage points and 0.4 or 1.0 percentage points. The credit-rationing effect on lending growth, i.e. that associated with a supply restriction due to a worsening in banks' capital position, is estimated to be -1.9 percentage points. By contrast, the easing of supply conditions -rarely reported in the BLS -does not have statistically significant effects. Changes in the BLS demand indicators instead have symmetric effects: an increase of demand reported by all banks in the panel is associated 9 with an increase of about 1 percentage point in the growth rate of lending, while a reported demand decrease is associated with a negative impact of the same order of magnitude.
Third, the inclusion of the sovereign spread erases the significance of the BLS supply indicator related to funding conditions, suggesting that -especially during the sovereign debt crisis -the credit supply tightening largely reflected the common sovereign debt shock and not idiosyncratic bank conditions at individual banks. Changes in the sovereign spread have a significant impact effect on the cost of loans to firms and households: a 100-basis-point rise in the spread is associated with a 25 basis points increase in the cost of new loans and a 0.4-percentage-point reduction in the quarterly loan growth rate.
Fourth, a counterfactual exercise comparing the fitted values from our estimates with those that would have obtained had supply and demand indicators remained unchanged at their pre-crisis levels (i.e., 2007QQ2) indicates that both demand weakness and supply restraints played significant roles throughout the crisis. The effects of the credit tightening on the interest rate on loans to firms were stronger in the sovereign debt crisis than in the global crisis: the cumulative effect is estimated at more than 2 percentage points through the second quarter of 2012, of which a third came during the global crisis and two thirds during the sovereign debt crisis. As to loan dynamics, both weak demand and tight supply exerted significant negative effects on lending to firms in both phases of the crisis; the estimated supply effects were stronger during the peaks of the crisis (2008Q4 and 2011Q4) . At the end of the sample period, supply factors are estimated to have had a cumulative negative impact on the stock of loans of more than 8 percent, which can be attributed in about the same proportion to the adjustment of loan demand to the increase in the cost and to credit rationing. Moreover, whereas during the global crisis supply effects on the cost of credit were mostly related to the banks' risk perception, during the sovereign crisis funding conditions became predominant. The effects on the growth rate of loans via the elasticity of demand to cost differed correspondingly. Credit rationing effects related to the banks' capital position were instead similar in the two phases of the crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents descriptive evidence. Section 3 illustrates the methodology used to define the loan demand and supply curves. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings, for both the baseline specification -in which the BLS supply and demand indicators are used as the main explanatory variables -and the extended specifications that also include the sovereign spread. Section 5 illustrates the counterfactual exercises assessing the relative importance of 10 demand and supply factors and comparing the effects during the sovereign debt crisis with those during the global financial crisis. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
BLS indicators and lending to enterprises: data and descriptive evidence
This section provides information on the data and some descriptive statistics. The data are for the panel of major Italian banking groups ("banks") participating in the BLS. The number of banks changes over time, due to mergers and additions of new respondents. In the pre-crisis period, 80 percent of the responses on supply conditions were in the "unchanged" category. Indications of an easing (either considerably or somewhat) were almost absent. Less than one fifth of the responses indicated "tightened somewhat", while very few indicated "tightened considerably". In the crisis period the percentage of answers in the "tightened" category rose sharply, to 37 and 29 percent, respectively, in the two phases 5 Mergers and acquisitions that involved the banks participating in the survey over the sample period were carefully addressed. They were treated by using the standard reclassification methods in the computation of the lending growth rate for the acquirer, which is included in the panel over the entire sample period, while the target bank is excluded as of the date of the operation (in the same way that individual bank data are treated in the BLS). We checked the robustness of the results by using a different approach, in which both of the banks involved are excluded from the panel and a new bank is included as of the date of the operation. The results do not change. 6 The pattern of loan dynamics for the banks in the BLS panel is similar to that for the system as a whole, although the rate of growth is on average lower over of the sample period. 7 Banks are asked the following question concerning supply conditions: "Over the past three months, how have your bank's credit standards as applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?". As to demand conditions, the question is: "Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises changed at your bank, apart from normal seasonal fluctuations?" In both cases, they can choose their answer among five options, as reported in Table 1. 11 of the crisis. As to the demand assessments, extreme answers were virtually absent over the whole sample period. The frequency of responses indicating a "decrease" more than doubled during the crisis, to 19 and 28 percent, respectively, in the two phases. distinction between "costs related to bank's capital position", "banks' ability to access market financing" and "bank's liquidity position"); ii) "pressure from competition"; iii) "perception of risk" (in turn relating to "expectations regarding general economic activity" or to more specific factors, such as "industry or firm-specific outlook" and "risk on collateral demanded"). 8 Figure 3 , based on the answers to these questions, shows that the relative importance of the factors affecting credit standards differed between the global crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. During the former, the tightening mostly reflected an increase in perception of risk, while the relevance of banks' cost of funds and balance-sheet constraints was limited.
In the latter, risk perceptions again played a role, but difficulties in obtaining market funding and banks' liquidity position were more important. This relevant difference was taken into account in designing the empirical exercises described below.
A general caveat, which applies to the data described in this Section, as to all surveybased data, is that their quality depends on the reliability and the truthfulness of the respondents' answers. In the case of lending surveys, banks might be inclined to report tighter credit standards than those they actually apply. This hypothesis originates from the observation that indications of ''tightening'' have historically outnumbered those of ''easing''; in addition, banks may have an incentive to report tighter policies if they fear that the information could be exploited for supervisory purposes. On the other hand, during the crisis banks were exposed to public criticism and political pressure, seen as responsible for a credit crunch, and so might have wished to portray their policies as less restrictive.
Methodology: the structural representation of the credit market
Identification strategy in a partial equilibrium framework
The econometric analysis involves estimating a system of two equations. The dependent variables are the cost and the growth rate of lending, which are expressed as functions of the BLS supply and demand indicators and other independent macro or bankspecific variables, as follows:
More specifically, the variables it bankspread  and it loans  are, respectively, the first difference of the spread between the average rate on new loans of bank i and the Eonia rate 9 in quarter t and the quarter-on-quarter rate of growth in bank lending for the same bank in the same quarter (corrected for the impact of securitization activity).
BLS_D it and BLS_S it are vectors of dummy variables based on bank i's replies in the BLS survey carried out at time t.
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In particular, the variables in BLS_D it are based on the answers concerning the banks' assessment of overall demand conditions. The variables in BLS_S it are based on the replies concerning the specific factors affecting supply conditions (see Section 2). The use of the specific factor indicators rather than the overall indicator is 9 We consider the difference between the bank loan rate and the Eonia rate in order to rule out the effects of monetary policy. Alternatively, one could consider the spread with respect to a longer-term interbank rate, such as 3-month Euribor. In a crisis period, however, the latter would be a less appropriate measure of the monetary stance, since it would also be affected by the increase in banks' risk aversion. 10 An alternative to replies at time t would be the cumulative levels of the BLS indicators through time t. As remarked by Del Giovane, Eramo and Nobili (2011) , this definition would be more consistent with a literal reading of the BLS questions and answers; however, the robustness analysis carried out in that paper shows that the inclusion of the cumulative indicators either gives unclear results or worsens the fit of the estimates (depending on the approach).
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important because in principle different sources of supply restriction call for different policy reactions. For example, if shortage of capital is the main cause of the tightening, recapitalization is the right response; in terms of monetary policy, acting on official interest rates could make more credit available by helping to pull the economy out of recession, when credit supply is impeded mainly by worries about borrowers' creditworthiness, whereas exceptional liquidity provision may be the proper course when the main problem is banks' funding difficulties. An additional reason for using the answers on the specific factors is that they can be more informative in certain phases, when banks reported unchanged overall supply conditions but indicated specific factors as contributing to a change in lending standards (Del Giovane, Eramo and .
The variables included in BLS_S it and BLS_D it are dummies indicating whether banks reported an increase/decrease in demand or a tightening/easing of supply conditions (due to specific factors). For example, BLS_D it includes dummy variables (BLS_D_decrease it and
BLS_D_increase it ) that take value 1 if bank i at time t reported, respectively, that demand decreased or increased (either "considerably" or "somewhat"). A similar structure applies to the dummies for the supply factors, where the question is whether the factor contributed (either "somewhat" or "considerably") to tighten or ease supply conditions. As is shown by Del Giovane, Eramo and Nobili (2011) , the choice of dummy variables -rather than single discrete variables for each indicator -helps capture non-linearity in the estimated relations between endogenous and exogenous variables, which may be particularly relevant in the case of the BLS supply indicators.
11
All the variables in BLS_S it and BLS_D it may enter contemporaneously and/or with a lag. The lag order for each variable is chosen by trying a range between 0 and 4 on the basis of the regression's fit and the indications derived from standard information criteria.
We also add bank-specific fixed effects (α ki , k=1,2) to control for unobserved bankspecific factors that might be correlated with the BLS variables and could result in inconsistent estimated coefficients. For example, different banks could interpret the qualitative BLS questions in different ways, so that their answers differ systematically.
The equations are further enriched with additional explanatory variables (X k it , k=1,2). First, we include the lagged value of the dependent variable, if statistically significant, to capture the autoregressive component of the correlations. Second, we include the individual bank's marginal cost of funding, which is computed as the difference between the weighted average of the interest rates paid by the bank on its new sources of funding (customer deposits and debt securities) and the Eonia rate, with the weights reflecting the relative importance of each type of liability. This addresses concerns that the BLS indicator of funding conditions, as a dummy, may capture banks' funding difficulties only in part and that the Eonia rate used as the base for computing the bank's mark-up, may also depend on other bank-specific variables not included in the equation. In the structural system (1)-(2) described above we use exclusion restrictions on the BLS indicators (and on the lagged dependent variables) in order to achieve identification. 14 The necessary and sufficient condition for identification in a system of simultaneous equations is the rank condition, i.e. that the matrix of coefficients for the set of variables 12 Angelini et al. (2011) and have shown that the interbank rates at longer maturities charged to Italian banks during the crisis depended significantly on some specific characteristics of borrowers and lenders and that some of the estimated correlations increased dramatically after the outbreak of the 2007-08 crisis. This might also be the case for overnight rates. 13 For Italy, see Casolaro et al. (2006) and Albertazzi et al. (2012) . The inclusion of these two variables in the equations does not change the results. Firms' financing needs are not statistically significant in any of the regressions. GDP only partly offsets the significance of the BLS demand decrease dummy. This is consistent with the fact that GDP is generally used as an explanatory variable in models of credit demand. The fact that the BLS demand indicator has additional explanatory power with respect to GDP is consistent with Del Giovane, Eramo and Nobili (2011) ; presumably this is because this indicator also reflects banks' assessment of demand factors not captured by GDP, such as the demand for inventories and working capital, debt restructuring and mergers and acquisitions. 14 In a system of simultaneous equations the lagged dependent variables are, by definition, pre-determined. In principle, they can be used as instruments in both equations. In our system, the exclusion restrictions on predetermined variables are based upon the statistical significance of their coefficients and the indications provided by the Sargan test. If θ 1 and θ 2 are, respectively, non-negative and non-positive, then equation (1) can be interpreted as a credit supply curve: a tightening in credit standards implies an increase in banks' margins and a decline in the rate of growth in lending, via the elasticity of loan demand (coefficient θ 2 ). Equation (2) can be read as a credit demand curve, where loan quantity depends negatively on the cost of credit. A downward (upward) shift in credit demand, as captured by the BLS indicator, leads to a decrease (increase) in both the loan growth rate and the bank mark-up, via the elasticity of the loan supply (coefficient θ 1 ).
A special case of this structural model is θ 1 =0, which is consistent with the common representation of the credit market under imperfect competition, where credit supply is flat and the intermediaries set interest rates and fully accommodate credit demand (Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Degryse, Kim and Ongena, 2009). 16 In this theoretical framework, a shift in credit demand would affect the quantity but not the cost of credit. Thus the distinction between a flat and an upward-sloping credit supply curve is tested empirically in this paper.
The structural equations (1) and (2) are estimated consistently using the two-step efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. This estimator minimizes the GMM criterion function J=N*g'*W*g, where N is sample size, g comprises the orthogonality or moment conditions (specifying that all the explanatory variables, or instruments, in the equation are uncorrelated with the error term) and W is a weighting matrix. In the two-step efficient GMM, the efficient or optimal weighting matrix is the inverse of the estimated covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions. This estimator is more efficient than the traditional IV/2SLS estimator for an over-identified system of equations and when the residuals present heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation (see Hayashi, 2000) . The selection of the model is based on a general-to-specific approach, where non-significant variables and/or lags are removed sequentially.
Notice that in the empirical analysis we deal with over-identified supply and demand equations, in which the number of excluded instruments is greater than the number of endogenous variables. The reliability of the over-identified restrictions is examined by 15 A simpler way to think about the identification via instrumentals: an equation is identified if and only if there are enough instruments for the right-hand-side endogenous variables that are fully correlated with these variables. In general, exclusion restrictions are necessary only for identification (they satisfy the order condition), but in a two-equation system they also satisfy the rank condition (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2002) . 16 See Panetta and Signoretti (2010) for a simple illustration of this theoretical framework and its possible use to interpret credit developments during the global crisis.
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running the Sargan-Hansen test for each structural equation separately. The joint null hypothesis tested is that the instruments are correctly excluded from the structural equation to be identified. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of over-identifying restrictions.
We also report the Wald version of the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) statistic for testing underidentification. Under the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified, the matrix of the reduced-form coefficients on the L1 instruments excluded has rank equal to (K1-1) where K1 is the number of endogenous regressors. Under the null hypothesis, this statistic is distributed as chi-squared with (L1-K1+1) degrees of freedom. A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column-rank and that the model is identified.
Identification strategy in a partial equilibrium framework with credit rationing
The system of equations (1) and (2) describes a framework in which the changes in the interest rate always ensure that the quantity supplied is equal to that demanded at every point in time, clearing the market. A clear, important shortcoming of this approach is its inability to capture "credit rationing". Broadly speaking, credit rationing occurs when, at the interest rate charged by the banks, the demand for loans exceeds the supply and lenders will not provide additional credit even if the borrowers are willing to pay higher rates. Essentially, credit rationing is a situation in which the lender's supply function has become perfectly price-inelastic, so interest rate adjustments do not clear the market. The possible causes of credit rationing include banks' balance-sheet constraints, risk aversion and asymmetric information.
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Most of the recent empirical analyses of credit rationing have taken the "quantitative approach" developed by Fair and Jaffee (1972) . 18 This approach posits that the quantity traded in a given market is the minimum between the amounts supplied and demanded ("short-side" rule) and that excess demand (or supply) is related to exogenous variables (in most cases, the change in the price level). Taking this approach, we use BLS data to determine the amount of excess credit demand (or supply). Accordingly, the system of equations (1)- (2) is modified as follows:
17 Banks may not want to raise lending rates above a certain level in order to avoid exposure to riskier borrowers (adverse selection) or to discourage firms from taking excessive risk (moral hazard). See the seminal work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . 18 See among others, Pazarbasioglu (1996) ; Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) ; Kim (1999) ; Barajas and Steiner (2002) ; Ikhide (2003) ; Baek (2005) ; Bauwens and Lubrano (2007) ; Allain and Oulidi (2009) .
Equations (3) and (4) are the non-observable quantities supplied and demanded. Equation (5) is the short-side rule. Equations (6) and (7) relate excess demand and excess supply to the banks that report a tightening or an easing of the different BLS supply factors considered.
We allow all the factors potentially to capture the credit rationing. If the coefficients σ 1 and σ 2 are statistically significant, this indicates that a tightening or an easing of the specific factor considered is correlated with, respectively, excess demand or supply.
Following the discussion in Fair and Jaffee (1972) , the system of equations (3)- (7) can be reduced to a system with a single supply and a single demand equation, as follows:
Notice that the mechanism for setting interest rates operates in each period but it does not necessarily clear the market. In each quarter the credit market may exhibit temporary credit rationing owing to imperfect flexibility in interest rates.
In practice, Figure 3 shows that our sample banks very rarely reported that some factor contributed to an easing of credit standards, making it impossible to estimate the coefficients σ 2 (L). Our test thus reduces to estimating whether the data are consistent with a credit market that is always in equilibrium (i.e., σ 1 (L)=0) or instead is characterized by episodes of credit rationing (σ 1 (L)<0).
The empirical results
Baseline specification using BLS supply factors
This section reports the results of the econometric estimation, first for the model with no credit rationing (described by equations (1)- (2)). The results for the supply equation are reported in column (a) of Table 2 , those for the demand equation in column (a'). As mentioned, the specifications are obtained following a general-to-specific approach.
Starting with the structural parameters, the coefficient for the loan spread in the demand equation is highly significant and negative, suggesting that we are correctly 18 identifying a downward-sloping demand curve. The estimated elasticity is high: a 100-basispoint increase in the loan mark-up is associated with a reduction in the quarterly growth rate of loans of more than 2 percentage points. In the loan supply equation, the coefficient of loan growth is positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that the credit market is characterized by a flat supply curve.
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As to the exogenous variables, in the supply equation none of the "easing" dummies is significant. This reflects the great asymmetry of the BLS supply indicators, which signal tightening on a number of occasions but very rarely easing. In fact, the reductions in the loan spread that are often observed in our sample period are captured by the negative and significant coefficients of its lagged values. "Tightening" replies, instead, are associated with significant effects on the loan spread. Diminished access to funding for banks -as captured by the BLS answers -has a statistically significant effect on the cost of credit, both on impact and with a one-quarter lag. The estimated coefficients indicate that the mark-up would be 40 basis points higher on impact if all the banks reported a tightening related to this factor than if none did. A tightening related to worsening risk perception is also found to exert a significant effect on loan rates, estimated at 50 basis points when banks reported that this factor contributed "considerably" to the tightening, and 20 basis points when it contributed "somewhat". Considering the interest rate elasticity of credit demand, the resulting contemporaneous effects on quantities would amount to a reduction of 0.8 percentage points in the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of lending for funding conditions and 0.4 and 1.0 percentage points, respectively, for risk perception. A tightening connected with the banks' capital position turns out not to be statistically significant. Finally, a 1-percentage-point increase in the marginal cost of funding is associated with a 10-basis-point rise in the mark-up.
In the loan demand equation, the dummies of the BLS demand indicator are significant and have the expected signs in the case of both an "increase" and a "decrease". The coefficients suggest that the relationship is symmetric: the case in which all banks report an 19 An important implication of a flat credit supply curve is that demand conditions, as captured by the BLS indicator, have no effect on the cost of credit via the elasticity of the loan supply curve to the loan growth rate. During a crisis, however, demand conditions may affect the bank mark-up directly when they reflect changes in the composition of borrowers (i.e. loan demand may be characterized by a larger fraction of riskier borrowers, inducing banks to increase margins). This would generate an omitted-variable problem in our model, which could be fully addressed only using bank-firm data from the Central Credit Registry, as was done for Italy in Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) and De Mitri, Gobbi and Sette (2010) . In the present paper, however, it is possible that the BLS risk perception indicator at least partly captures a change in borrower composition; moreover, the banks in our sample are relatively large and have a similar business model, so that this concern is possibly weaker than in other studies based on bank-level data.
increase (a decrease) in demand is associated to a rise (fall) in the quarter-on-quarter credit growth of 1 percentage point.
Specification with credit rationing
All in all, the signs of the structural parameters and the exogenous variables suggest that the identification provided by the system of equations (1)- (2) In light of the discussion in Section 3, this result is consistent with the thesis that the implicit assumption of this identification scheme -namely that changes in interest rates always clear the credit market -could not be valid. Instead, the BLS indicator of bank's capital position could carry information on credit rationing phenomena and, as such, directly affect loan quantities. Accordingly, we estimate a system consistent with the representation given by equations (8)- (9), in which the BLS supply factor related to the capital position conditions is part of the equation for loan demand. The results are displayed in columns (b) and (b') of Table 2 .
The direct effect of the BLS capital position indicator on loan demand is negative and highly significant; a tightening of this factor is associated with a decline of about 1.9 percentage points in the quarter-on-quarter loan growth rate. The coefficients of the remaining variables in the equation, including the estimated slope of the loan demand curve, do not change substantially compared with the previous specification.
The diagnostic tests fully support this identification scheme. In particular, the SarganHansen test and the Kleibergen-Paap statistics accept the identifying restrictions in both equations at any conventional significance level. Overall, this system specification provides evidence that the credit supply curve is flat in normal times, becoming temporarily price- 20 The statistic is defined as the difference between the Sargan-Hansen statistic of the equation with the smaller set of instruments (valid under both the null and alternative hypotheses) and the equation with the full set of instruments, i.e., including the instruments whose validity is suspect. Under the null hypothesis that both the smaller set of instruments and the additional, suspect instruments are valid, the statistic is distributed as chisquared in the number of excluded instruments tested.
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inelastic when banks reported a worsening in their capital position, which is consistent with the thesis of credit rationing during financial crisis.
Including the sovereign spread
During the sovereign debt crisis analysts and policymakers have paid considerable attention to developments in the spreads between the sovereign bond yields of the euro-area countries hit by the tensions and those of Germany. Indeed, this spread has been seen as a sort of "sufficient statistic", an adequate gauge of the severity of the strains. During the crisis period the BLS survey added a number of ad hoc questions about its impact on the banks' credit policy. The responses suggest that the overall impact was significant. 21 Albertazzi et al. (2012) have analysed reduced-form relationships between the BTP-Bund spread and developments in various credit market segments in Italy using macro data for the entire banking system. Their results indicate that the effects were quite substantial. Neri (2013) and Zoli (2013) have also found that the sovereign spread significantly affected banks' lending rates in a number of countries, including Italy.
In light of the foregoing, we deemed it useful to investigate the information content of the spread for both the credit demand and supply curves. We first test the role of the sovereign spread as a credit supply shifter. To this end, we re-estimate the system of equations (8)- (9) including as an instrument in the loan supply equation the change in the difference between the yields on the 10-year Italian and German government bonds. Since the sovereign spread is a macro variable common to all banks, the estimated standard errors may be lower than the true ones (see Moulton, 1990 ). Accordingly we computed the standard errors by clustering observations over periods of time. The results are reported in columns (a)-(a') of Table 3 .
The estimated coefficients of the sovereign spread are positive and highly significant: a 100-basis-point increase in the spread is associated with an immediate pass-through of around 25 basis points and (as a result of the lag structure of the model) with a cumulative effect of about 30 basis points after one quarter, similar to the findings of the studies based on aggregate data (see Albertazzi et al., 2012; Neri, 2013; Zoli, 2013) . Considering the interest rate elasticity of credit demand, the corresponding effects on quantities would 21 Tensions in the sovereign debt market may affect banks' balance sheets and lending conditions through several channels: banks hold sizeable portfolios of their own country's government bonds; government securities are used as collateral in secured interbank transactions; yields on government bonds may be a benchmark for alternative assets; and the creditworthiness of the government affects the value of the explicit or implicit guarantee provided to the banking sector. See BIS (2011) .
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amount to a reduction in quarter-on-quarter growth of, respectively, around 0.4 and 0.5 percentage points.
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The sovereign spread appears to have predictive power over the entire sample period, not only during the crisis: the interaction between the spread and the crisis or the sovereign-crisis dummy is not statistically significant. This is not really surprising, however, as such a large part of the entire sample period is made up of the crisis years.
An important result is that including the sovereign spread wipes out the significance of the BLS funding conditions indicator and the bank-specific marginal cost and also reduces the coefficient of the BLS risk-perception indicators somewhat. This suggests that, at least during the sovereign debt crisis, the relationship between banks' funding difficulties and credit developments largely reflected the sovereign debt strains. Thus, the common shock to the banking system, captured by the changes in the sovereign debt spread, dominated the idiosyncratic components represented by the individual bank's marginal cost of funding and answers to the BLS.
In the above regression, lacking information on potential credit rationing, we treated the sovereign spread as a standard supply shifter. In fact, the Sargan-Hansen test accepts all the over-identifying restrictions used for identification, including the exclusion of the sovereign spread from the demand equation. Nonetheless, we further tested this restriction by including the sovereign spread in the loan demand equation: its coefficient is not statistically significant and the various diagnostics strongly reject this alternative specification, even when interacted with the sovereign-crisis dummy.
Next we checked whether the effects of changes in the sovereign spread differed depending on whether they are caused by yield changes on Italian or on German bonds.
Actually, during the crisis the spread reflected both idiosyncratic factors related to economic and public finance developments in Italy and more general "flight-to-quality" phenomena connected with the investors' fears of euro reversibility ("redenomination risk"). The former effects are likely to increase the yield on BTPs for a given Bund yield, while the latter should lower Bund yield for a given BTP yield. In principle, one may expect that the idiosyncratic factors have a stronger impact on lending supply conditions. 22 As in previous studies, here we focus on the effects of a temporary increase in the sovereign spread (i.e. a rise of the spread at time t which is reabsorbed in the following quarter). A more persistent shock would have stronger effects; e.g. a rise of the spread of the same magnitude at time t which persisted at time t+1 would be associated to an increase of the loan spread by more than 50 basis points after one quarter. The quarter-onquarter growth rate of lending would fall by about 1 percentage point.
To test this proposition empirically, we replaced the sovereign spread among the explanatory variables of the supply equation by including separately the BTP and the Bund yields. The results, reported in columns (b)-(b') of Table 3 , show that a rise in the BTP yield does in fact have a stronger effect on the cost of loans to enterprises than a reduction in the Bund yield. The pass-through after one quarter is around 75 basis points in the former case and 50 in the latter.
The inclusion of the sovereign spread could raise problems of endogeneity, because the changes in this variable could themselves be determined by credit demand and supply conditions. But in Italy -unlike other countries -the causal link clearly runs from the sovereign debt tensions to the difficulties of the banking system, and not the other way round. Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider the spread as an exogenous variable in our regressions. In any case, to address the endogeneity concern, we ran additional estimates, first regressing the sovereign spread on the BLS demand and supply factors and then including the residual of this auxiliary equation in the main regression, so as to have an orthogonalized version of the sovereign spread as causal variable. The estimated coefficients for the auxiliary regression indicate that the behaviour of the sovereign spread mainly affects supply factors, lending support to our structural interpretation. Moreover, in the main regression all the structural coefficients remain virtually unchanged, confirming that the endogeneity of the spread is not a relevant concern.
Assessing the role of supply and demand factors: Is the sovereign debt crisis different from the global crisis?
In the previous sections we have shown that the BLS demand and supply indicators and the sovereign spread may help identify structural demand and supply curves for business lending. Now we use the empirical models to quantify the contribution of supply and demand to changes in the cost and the volume of loans during the two phases of the financial crisis. To this end we perform a counterfactual exercise setting the supply and demand indicators constant throughout the crisis at their pre-crisis (2007Q2) levels. Based on the estimated parameters we can calculate the values of the loan spread and growth rate in this counterfactual scenario and compare them with the fitted values based on actual demand and supply indicators, thus obtaining an estimate of each factor's contribution.
We perform the counterfactual analysis using the specification presented in columns Table 2 . Figures 4a and 4b show the quarterly contribution of each factor to the change in the cost and the growth rate of loans to firms. Complementary information is 23 provided by Figures 5a and 5b , which show the corresponding cumulative effects over the entire crisis period. Finally, Table 4 provides a more compact illustration of the effects of demand and supply factors, in terms of their quantification and sources, by reporting the estimates of the cumulative effects in the two phases of the financial crisis.
The results indicate that supply factors -as measured by the BLS indicators -had a substantial effect on both the cost and the availability of credit throughout the crisis. The magnitude of the effects was stronger on average during the sovereign debt than during the global financial crisis.
As regards the cost of credit, the tightening of supply conditions is estimated to have determined a quarterly rise of around 70 basis points at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis At the end of the sample period (2012Q2), demand conditions are estimated to have determined a cumulative reduction of about 12 percent in the stock of loans. Supply factors are estimated to have had a cumulative impact of more than 8 percent. The part of this negative effect that can be ascribed to credit rationing is estimated to be about 4 percent, equally distributed in the two phases of the crisis.
We also carried out the counterfactual exercise using the specification of columns (a)-(a') of Table 3 , which includes the sovereign spread. The estimates of the cumulative effects in the two phases of the financial crisis are reported in Table 5 . In terms of the relative contribution of demand and supply, the results are very similar to the foregoing. The impact of risk perception is slightly smaller; that of the sovereign spread during the second phase of the crisis is somewhat greater compared to the impact of the BLS "pure" supply factors in the previous specification.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we use the indicators of supply and demand conditions based on Italian banks' responses in the euro-area Bank Lending Survey to estimate structural relationships that can assess the relative role of supply and demand in determining the dynamics of the cost and volume of lending to enterprises in Italy. Our framework allows us to test for the presence of credit rationing. The dataset combines the qualitative information obtained from the BLS with micro-data on loans granted by the participating Italian banks.
We found that in normal circumstances the functioning of the Italian credit market is consistent with the standard theoretical models of imperfect competition, in which banks set the interest rates based on borrower risk and their own funding constraints and fully accommodate changes in credit demand (i.e. the loan supply schedule is perfectly elastic to changes in interest rates). However, we also found that during the crisis periods, when banks reported having tightened their credit standards because of capital constraints, the supply schedule becomes price-inelastic and suggestive of credit rationing, in keeping with models in which lenders limit the supply of credit to borrowers even when they are willing to pay higher interest rates.
A counterfactual exercise suggests that both demand and supply factors played a relevant role throughout the crisis. The effects of the supply restriction on both the cost and the availability of credit were, on average, stronger during the sovereign debt crisis than the 25 global crisis. And whereas during the global crisis supply effects on the cost of credit were mostly related to the banks' risk perception, during the sovereign crisis funding conditions became predominant. The effects on the growth rate of loans via the elasticity of demand to cost differed correspondingly. Credit rationing effects related to the banks' capital position were instead similar in the two phases of the crisis.
To the extent that the Italian experience can be considered paradigmatic also for other euro-area countries, the differences we found in the origins of the credit restriction and in the magnitude of the various effects corroborate the ECB's mix of policy measures to counteract the effects of the crisis on lending, in order to sustain the financing of enterprises and break or at least attenuate the negative spiral between the financial tensions, the tightening of credit conditions and the deterioration of the real economy. In this respect, an interesting extension for future research would be to include bank-level information on the recourse to the Eurosystem's longer-term refinancing operations in our structural model. This would allow us to contribute to the growing empirical literature on the effects of unconventional monetary policy on credit conditions and on the real economy. Notes: The dependent variables "Δ(mark-up)" and "Δloan" are, respectively, the quarterly change in bank mark-up (computed as the difference between the average rate on new loans and the Eonia rate) and the quarterly change in loan quantity. "BLS supply, capital position, tightening", "BLS supply funding conditions, tightening", "BLS supply, risk perception, tightening" (also distinguishing whether the bank reported that this factor contributed considerably/somewhat to a tightening), are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a bank reported that this factor contributed to a tightening in credit supply conditions. "BLS demand, decrease", "BLS demand, increase" are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the bank reported, respectively, decrease/increase in demand. *, ** and *** denote significance, respectively, at 10%, 5% and 1%. The "Underidentification test" is a Lagrange-Multiplier test of the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified (i.e. the matrix of reduced-form coefficients on the L1 excluded instruments has rank K1-1), while the alternative hypothesis is that the equation is identified (i.e. the matrix has rank exactly equal to K1). Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in (L1-K1+1) degrees of freedom. The "Overidentification test" is based on the SarganHansen statistics: under the null hypothesis that the exclusion restrictions are valid, the test statistic is distributed as chisquared in the (L-K) number of tested over-identifying restrictions. Notes: The dependent variables "Δ(mark-up)" and "Δloan" are, respectively, the quarterly change in bank mark-up (computed as the difference between the average rate on new loans and the Eonia rate) and the quarterly change in loan quantity. "BLS supply, capital position, tightening", "BLS supply funding conditions, tightening", "BLS supply, risk perception, tightening" (also distinguishing whether the bank reported that this factor contributed considerably/somewhat to a tightening), are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a bank reported that this factor contributed to a tightening in credit supply conditions. "BLS demand, decrease", "BLS demand, increase" are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the bank reported, respectively, decrease/increase in demand. *, ** and *** denote significance, respectively, at 10%, 5% and 1%. The "Underidentification test" is a Lagrange-Multiplier test of the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified (i.e. the matrix of reduced form coefficients on the L1 excluded instruments has rank K1-1), while the alternative hypothesis is that the equation is identified (i.e. the matrix has rank exactly equal to K1). Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in (L1-K1+1) degrees of freedom. The "Overidentification test" is based on the Sargan-Hansen statistics: under the null hypothesis that the exclusion restrictions are valid, the test statistic is distributed as chisquared in the (L-K) number of tested over-identifying restrictions. Table 5 Counterfactual exercise: estimated cumulative contribution of supply and demand factors to the cost and growth rate of loans to enterprises including the sovereign spread (based on columns (a)-(a') of 03Q2  03Q3  03Q4  04Q1  04Q2  04Q3  04Q4  05Q1  05Q2  05Q3  05Q4  06Q1  06Q2  06Q3  06Q4  07Q1  07Q2  07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4  10Q1  10Q2  10Q3  10Q4  11Q1  11Q2  11Q3  11Q4  12Q1 03Q3  03Q4  04Q1  04Q2  04Q3  04Q4  05Q1  05Q2  05Q3  05Q4  06Q1  06Q2  06Q3  06Q4  07Q1  07Q2  07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4  10Q1  10Q2  10Q3  10Q4  11Q1  11Q2  11Q3  11Q4  12Q1 07Q4  08Q4  09Q4  10Q4  11Q4  07Q4  08Q4  09Q4  10Q4  11Q4  07Q4  08Q4  09Q4  10Q4  11Q4  07Q4  08Q4  09Q4  10Q4  11Q4  07Q4  08Q4  09Q4  10Q4  11Q4  07Q4  08Q4  09Q4  10Q4 07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4  10Q1  10Q2  10Q3  10Q4  11Q1  11Q2  11Q3  11Q4  12Q1 07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4  10Q1  10Q2  10Q3  10Q4  11Q1  11Q2  11Q3  11Q4  12Q1 07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4  10Q1  10Q2  10Q3  10Q4  11Q1  11Q2  11Q3  11Q4  12Q1 07Q3  07Q4  08Q1  08Q2  08Q3  08Q4  09Q1  09Q2  09Q3  09Q4  10Q1  10Q2  10Q3  10Q4  11Q1  11Q2  11Q3  11Q4  12Q1  12Q2 Risk perception BLS funding conditions
Tables and Figures
1="eased considerably" 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1="decreased considerably" 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.4) 2="eased somewhat" 2 (1.5) 1 (1.2) 0 (0.0) 2="decreased5="tightened considerably" 3 (2.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.4) 5="increased considerably" 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Capital position Marginal cost of funding Demand
